“一帶一路”：PPP模式如何發(fā)揮作用？
2017-12-27
“一帶一路”速覽
a.陸地和海上通道
b.60多個(gè)國(guó)家、三個(gè)大洲
c.以6個(gè)交通走廊為中心
d. 涉及全球65%的人口和35%的GDP
e.目標(biāo)包括減少貿(mào)易壁壘、推進(jìn)設(shè)施和人口的互聯(lián)、金融一體化和政策協(xié)調(diào)
作為中國(guó)政府的一項(xiàng)重要戰(zhàn)略，“一帶一路”戰(zhàn)略謀求恢復(fù)中國(guó)連接亞洲、歐洲和非洲的傳統(tǒng)貿(mào)易路線，促進(jìn)沿線60多個(gè)國(guó)家、覆蓋全球三分之二人口和三分之一GDP區(qū)域的經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)和聯(lián)系。
中國(guó)在不同的“一帶一路”國(guó)家的投資很可能會(huì)以不同形式進(jìn)行。本文著重介紹為何政府和社會(huì)資本合作（PPP）模式在“一帶一路”沿線國(guó)家的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目中能夠發(fā)揮核心作用，并列出在“一帶一路”戰(zhàn)略中成功實(shí)施PPP模式應(yīng)具備的條件。
PPP模式可為中國(guó)和“一帶一路”沿線國(guó)家提供獨(dú)一無(wú)二的在降低政府財(cái)政負(fù)擔(dān)的基礎(chǔ)上發(fā)展基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目的機(jī)遇。在為“一帶一路”沿線國(guó)家當(dāng)?shù)厮綘I(yíng)領(lǐng)域創(chuàng)造長(zhǎng)期發(fā)展平臺(tái)的同時(shí)，該模式可以確保東道國(guó)政府“投入”項(xiàng)目和項(xiàng)目可靠性，為中國(guó)出口專業(yè)技術(shù)、商品和服務(wù)提供渠道。
為項(xiàng)目選擇PPP模式
如前所述，為實(shí)現(xiàn)中國(guó)作為“一帶一路”發(fā)起國(guó)、其他東道國(guó)政府以及其他市場(chǎng)參與方（包括股權(quán)投資人、融資方和承包商）的目標(biāo)，根據(jù)相關(guān)行業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)和戰(zhàn)略重要性，PPP的執(zhí)行方式可能是多種多樣的。PPP不是一個(gè)“一刀切”的模式。例如，如主要目標(biāo)是通過吸引社會(huì)資本來(lái)降低政府財(cái)政負(fù)擔(dān)（這是英國(guó)PPP模式的主要驅(qū)動(dòng)因素），則BOT/BOO模式比簡(jiǎn)單的服務(wù)合同模式更好，因?yàn)榉?wù)合同模式下資本投入仍然是公共機(jī)構(gòu)的責(zé)任。如主要目標(biāo)是轉(zhuǎn)移風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，則特許權(quán)模式可能是更合適的選擇，澳大利亞多個(gè)收費(fèi)公路項(xiàng)目都采用了這一模式。但是，如東道國(guó)政府希望保持對(duì)服務(wù)或資產(chǎn)的控制權(quán)或每隔幾年可以對(duì)私營(yíng)機(jī)構(gòu)重新評(píng)估或重新進(jìn)行安排，則服務(wù)/管理合同或租賃安排可能是更合適的選擇。
為滿足政府在項(xiàng)目實(shí)施中對(duì)透明度越來(lái)越高的要求，成熟PPP市場(chǎng)越來(lái)越多地采用合資公司模式。在“一帶一路”背景下，合資公司可作為中國(guó)的替代投資方式，該模式同時(shí)可降低對(duì)東道國(guó)政府信用的顧慮，可以鼓勵(lì)有意與中國(guó)知名企業(yè)共同投資的第三方股權(quán)投資人（無(wú)論是來(lái)自中國(guó)還是其他國(guó)家）參與項(xiàng)目。
東道國(guó)政府和雙邊投資協(xié)定的作用
PPP模式的共性是社會(huì)資本參與方與出讓服務(wù)/管理合同或授予BOT或特許權(quán)的政府機(jī)關(guān)共同發(fā)揮重要作用。如政府機(jī)關(guān)或東道國(guó)政府為獲得項(xiàng)目股權(quán)設(shè)立合資公司，則又增添了一層含義。
雖然中國(guó)是“一帶一路”戰(zhàn)略的總發(fā)起人，但在“一帶一路”沿線國(guó)家實(shí)施PPP項(xiàng)目仍需要東道國(guó)政府的相關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)積極參與，包括負(fù)責(zé)為東道國(guó)政府籌集向私營(yíng)機(jī)構(gòu)付款資金的財(cái)政部。PPP模式的“合作”因素也因此在“一帶一路”戰(zhàn)略中具有更廣的含義，包括中國(guó)與相關(guān)東道國(guó)政府以及相關(guān)東道國(guó)政府機(jī)關(guān)與合作的私營(yíng)機(jī)構(gòu)之間的關(guān)系。我們將在下文“東道國(guó)政府的投入和可靠性”章節(jié)進(jìn)一步闡述。
為確保東道國(guó)政府合作和積極參與，中國(guó)政府在雙邊投資協(xié)定方面已經(jīng)取得了顯著進(jìn)展。確保上述協(xié)定適應(yīng)“一帶一路”戰(zhàn)略的寬度和廣度對(duì)各方都大有裨益。
適用不同資產(chǎn)類型的PPP模式
PPP模式已運(yùn)用于世界范圍內(nèi)的多種類型項(xiàng)目，包括道路、橋梁、隧道、鐵路、港口、機(jī)場(chǎng)和寬帶服務(wù)等經(jīng)濟(jì)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，也包括社會(huì)保障住房、學(xué)校、醫(yī)院、監(jiān)獄、水務(wù)、廢物處理和國(guó)防設(shè)施等社會(huì)/公共基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。在一定程度上，在上述領(lǐng)域?qū)嵤㏄PP模式是自我選擇的結(jié)果：租賃合同和特許權(quán)模式在吸引特定用戶付款的經(jīng)濟(jì)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施（如港口、機(jī)場(chǎng)和收費(fèi)公路）中更易實(shí)施，而服務(wù)/管理合同和各種形式的BOT安排在更廣泛的經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)領(lǐng)域中可以得到運(yùn)用。
如上文所述，具體項(xiàng)目的合同安排可根據(jù)中國(guó)、相關(guān)東道國(guó)政府和社會(huì)資本的要求進(jìn)行相應(yīng)調(diào)整。
PPP的優(yōu)點(diǎn)
1.降低財(cái)政負(fù)擔(dān)
?。?）使用社會(huì)資本
無(wú)論項(xiàng)目資金成本的大小，吸引社會(huì)資本投資都可以降低中國(guó)和/或東道國(guó)政府的資金承諾，并刺激商業(yè)債務(wù)市場(chǎng)的資金供應(yīng)。雖然上述優(yōu)點(diǎn)在BOT或特許權(quán)PPP模式中最為明顯（可以促使社會(huì)資本提供大額的初期開發(fā)費(fèi)用），服務(wù)/管理合同或租賃安排也可以釋放流動(dòng)資金、確保服務(wù)的成本確定性，從而協(xié)助東道國(guó)政府對(duì)預(yù)算的管理。
通過(a)吸引社會(huì)資本；以及(b)向東道國(guó)政府轉(zhuǎn)移大部分資金負(fù)擔(dān)（如根據(jù)服務(wù)/管理合同或BOT模式，東道國(guó)政府將負(fù)責(zé)向私營(yíng)機(jī)構(gòu)支付提供相關(guān)服務(wù)的費(fèi)用），中國(guó)規(guī)模巨大的“一帶一路”投資可以通過PPP模式得以深化。
長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，利用社會(huì)資本還可以推動(dòng)?xùn)|道國(guó)金融市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展。
（2）社會(huì)資本規(guī)律
利用社會(huì)資本的優(yōu)點(diǎn)不僅在于可以提供資金。外部融資方的參與可能會(huì)創(chuàng)造良好的合同結(jié)構(gòu)，以確保(a)按時(shí)、按預(yù)算和按標(biāo)準(zhǔn)交付相關(guān)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施；以及(b)項(xiàng)目良好運(yùn)營(yíng)、嚴(yán)格的盡職調(diào)查以及在項(xiàng)目期內(nèi)信息提供的及時(shí)性。私人債權(quán)和股權(quán)融資人推動(dòng)PPP順利完成的動(dòng)機(jī)將其利益與中國(guó)和“一帶一路”合作伙伴的利益統(tǒng)一起來(lái)。
?。?）東道國(guó)信用狀況
由于很多“一帶一路”國(guó)家是發(fā)展中的經(jīng)濟(jì)體，對(duì)社會(huì)資本及其融資方來(lái)說(shuō)東道國(guó)政府的信用狀況可能是一個(gè)問題。通過在合同期內(nèi)分?jǐn)倴|道國(guó)政府的付款義務(wù)，PPP模式一定程度上緩解了這一問題。中國(guó)還可能可以提供擔(dān)?；蚱渌庞弥С?，進(jìn)一步降低社會(huì)資本投資“一帶一路”國(guó)家的障礙。
通過提供信用支持和保險(xiǎn)產(chǎn)品、設(shè)立項(xiàng)目結(jié)構(gòu)份額，多邊金融機(jī)構(gòu)在協(xié)助東道國(guó)政府以對(duì)社會(huì)資本而言可融資/可投資的方式實(shí)施項(xiàng)目，進(jìn)而管理發(fā)展中國(guó)家的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)方面一直很活躍。中國(guó)也可以采用類似方式，例如通過亞洲基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資銀行參與項(xiàng)目。盡管亞洲基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資銀行不是“一帶一路”的正式組成部分，但可以為“一帶一路”的成功實(shí)施發(fā)揮重要作用。
?。?）中國(guó)的角色
減少對(duì)中國(guó)“一帶一路”預(yù)算的依賴還可以令中國(guó)和中國(guó)公司投資項(xiàng)目的渠道多元化。政府間資助的模式導(dǎo)致中國(guó)扮演了項(xiàng)目發(fā)起人的角色，承受大量投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。如采用PPP模式，前期資金成本由社會(huì)資本承擔(dān)，東道國(guó)政府負(fù)責(zé)持續(xù)支付服務(wù)費(fèi)用，而中國(guó)可選擇通過直接向項(xiàng)目提供商業(yè)貸款、股權(quán)投資、提供信用支持或結(jié)構(gòu)性支持等方式參與，或?qū)⒆陨淼慕巧抻谕扑]中國(guó)承包商。這樣一來(lái)，PPP模式可催生貿(mào)易和資本投資活動(dòng)并為中國(guó)的產(chǎn)能打開大門，同時(shí)，利用PPP模式獲得社會(huì)資本和東道國(guó)政府的長(zhǎng)期收入流使得中國(guó)可以將自身“一帶一路”戰(zhàn)略的預(yù)算投資于更多國(guó)家和地區(qū)。
2.有效的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分?jǐn)?br />
在PPP模式下，設(shè)計(jì)、建設(shè)、完工和運(yùn)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分別由最有能力管理上述風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的當(dāng)事方承擔(dān)。特別是在發(fā)展中的“一帶一路”國(guó)家，東道國(guó)政府機(jī)關(guān)可能不具有必要的長(zhǎng)期項(xiàng)目管理能力，而（當(dāng)?shù)?、中?guó)或者第三國(guó)的）社會(huì)資本有，因此，與項(xiàng)目交付相關(guān)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)應(yīng)向社會(huì)資本轉(zhuǎn)移。這種模式下，由具有能力管理該風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的當(dāng)事方來(lái)管理或吸收風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，可以更經(jīng)濟(jì)的方式定價(jià)和降低成本，中國(guó)和其“一帶一路”的合作伙伴可以實(shí)現(xiàn)價(jià)值最大化。
PPP項(xiàng)目前期融資階段進(jìn)行的全周期分析也將鼓勵(lì)當(dāng)事方在一開始就尋找令所有參與方滿意的全面的技術(shù)和商業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)解決方案，必然有助于降低項(xiàng)目的整體成本。
3.東道國(guó)政府投入和可靠性
無(wú)論采用何種模式，東道國(guó)政府的支持和承諾對(duì)于“一帶一路”戰(zhàn)略的成功都至關(guān)重要。通過要求政府重視和取得服務(wù)所有權(quán)，PPP模式提高了政府通過合作方式“投入”相關(guān)服務(wù)的可能性。政府機(jī)關(guān)設(shè)定服務(wù)規(guī)范和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，并通過招標(biāo)程序評(píng)估私營(yíng)機(jī)構(gòu)達(dá)成相關(guān)要求的能力。在收到私營(yíng)機(jī)構(gòu)的反饋后，政府還可以對(duì)上述要求進(jìn)行變更。
在指定中標(biāo)人后，政府可以通過合同條款（包括收取損害賠償金和扣減合同款）確保其要求得以執(zhí)行。相應(yīng)的，政府需要對(duì)制定的規(guī)范和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)（及其執(zhí)行情況）、選擇合作的私營(yíng)機(jī)構(gòu)以及支付服務(wù)款項(xiàng)承擔(dān)責(zé)任。
受益于其管理大型項(xiàng)目的豐富經(jīng)驗(yàn)，中國(guó)可以與東道國(guó)政府（特別是發(fā)展中“一帶一路”國(guó)家）協(xié)商進(jìn)一步完善項(xiàng)目流程。這將為政策協(xié)調(diào)、政治合作以及人員和設(shè)施的互聯(lián)提供一個(gè)平臺(tái)，實(shí)現(xiàn)“一帶一路”的目標(biāo)。
4.出口
通過PPP模式，中國(guó)可以在“一帶一路”項(xiàng)目中發(fā)揮除提供資金以外的重要作用。如：
a.在項(xiàng)目采購(gòu)、交付和運(yùn)營(yíng)階段向“一帶一路”國(guó)家提供其大型項(xiàng)目管理的知識(shí)和經(jīng)驗(yàn)；
b.提供商品和服務(wù)（包括作為項(xiàng)目產(chǎn)品和設(shè)備的供應(yīng)商）；以及
c.最重要的，通過作為項(xiàng)目承包商的中國(guó)企業(yè)提供專業(yè)技術(shù)。
d.除令中國(guó)的出口更加多元以及釋放中國(guó)的產(chǎn)能并幫助中國(guó)企業(yè)“走出去”外，PPP模式還將加快中國(guó)從生產(chǎn)型國(guó)家向服務(wù)型國(guó)家的轉(zhuǎn)化過程。
5.利用社會(huì)資本的能力
PPP模式的核心是最大限度地利用社會(huì)資本的能力。這一特性對(duì)于“一帶一路”國(guó)家投入項(xiàng)目以及通過利用本地資源實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)乘數(shù)效應(yīng)至關(guān)重要。中國(guó)完全能夠通過輸出其豐富的專業(yè)技術(shù)能力彌補(bǔ)東道國(guó)的能力缺陷，為長(zhǎng)期協(xié)商和合作奠定堅(jiān)實(shí)的基礎(chǔ)。
6.外商投資限制
中國(guó)投資項(xiàng)目面臨的一個(gè)實(shí)際問題是一些“一帶一路”國(guó)家對(duì)外資持股的限制。PPP模式可以變更項(xiàng)目投資的性質(zhì)，從而解決這一問題，并且使東道國(guó)政府無(wú)需在吸引中國(guó)資金和放寬對(duì)外商投資的限制之間做出艱難選擇。
7.靈活性
如上文所述，PPP模式在私營(yíng)機(jī)構(gòu)資本投資、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分?jǐn)偂⒒貓?bào)方式以及中國(guó)在項(xiàng)目中的作用等方面有靈活性。靈活性是PPP模式的主要優(yōu)點(diǎn)之一。
8.標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化
從中長(zhǎng)期而言，PPP模式可以為“一帶一路”國(guó)家和整個(gè)“一帶一路”走廊的發(fā)展模式、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分?jǐn)?、政府出資模式、社會(huì)資本融資結(jié)構(gòu)、擔(dān)保安排、合同文本和爭(zhēng)議解決提供標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化平臺(tái)。標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化在英國(guó)和澳大利亞等成熟PPP市場(chǎng)已基本實(shí)現(xiàn)，改善了項(xiàng)目的成本和時(shí)間效率。同樣，采用PPP模式可加速中國(guó)和東道國(guó)政府實(shí)現(xiàn)“一帶一路”目標(biāo)的進(jìn)程。
PPP模式的成功因素
為實(shí)現(xiàn)PPP模式可帶來(lái)的利益，中國(guó)和“一帶一路”國(guó)家需要合作，確保具備成功實(shí)施PPP模式所需的關(guān)鍵條件。
盡管根據(jù)國(guó)別或資產(chǎn)類型不同，需要搭建的架構(gòu)或者面臨的挑戰(zhàn)可能存在差異，但PPP項(xiàng)目的主要成功因素包括：
1.合適的國(guó)家、行業(yè)和項(xiàng)目
為實(shí)現(xiàn)“一帶一路”目標(biāo)，需要認(rèn)真選擇實(shí)施PPP模式的國(guó)家、行業(yè)和項(xiàng)目。如某個(gè)“一帶一路”國(guó)家沒有成功實(shí)施PPP項(xiàng)目的長(zhǎng)期記錄，則應(yīng)該選擇有當(dāng)?shù)卣嬷С值暮?jiǎn)單的項(xiàng)目，而不選擇復(fù)雜的項(xiàng)目。簡(jiǎn)單的項(xiàng)目也會(huì)緩解參與PPP項(xiàng)目的東道國(guó)政府、社會(huì)資本和中國(guó)政府機(jī)關(guān)的壓力，以便在開展更復(fù)雜的PPP項(xiàng)目前更加熟悉和了解PPP模式。在項(xiàng)目實(shí)施中，建立可信度非常重要。
2.合適的PPP模式
任何PPP項(xiàng)目的成功很大程度上取決于PPP模式的選擇。在決策過程中必須具有靈活性，不拘泥于任何一個(gè)PPP模式，不斷審查項(xiàng)目實(shí)施的目標(biāo)，確保在PPP模式的選擇中反映項(xiàng)目的變化。
3.目標(biāo)明確
應(yīng)花時(shí)間確定項(xiàng)目的參數(shù)、規(guī)范和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，項(xiàng)目是否成功只應(yīng)根據(jù)上述參數(shù)、規(guī)范和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進(jìn)行衡量。一個(gè)國(guó)家的一個(gè)項(xiàng)目的錯(cuò)誤評(píng)估可能會(huì)對(duì)后續(xù)項(xiàng)目產(chǎn)生不利影響。
4.合理的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分?jǐn)?br />
PPP結(jié)構(gòu)中被廣泛認(rèn)可的原則是，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)應(yīng)由最有能力管理相關(guān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的一方承擔(dān)。不恰當(dāng)?shù)娘L(fēng)險(xiǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致私營(yíng)機(jī)構(gòu)將其轉(zhuǎn)嫁到定價(jià)上，對(duì)PPP的價(jià)值產(chǎn)生不利影響。此外，還可能增加私營(yíng)機(jī)構(gòu)違約和項(xiàng)目終止的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。最后，無(wú)論是哪一方的過錯(cuò)，如項(xiàng)目由于私營(yíng)機(jī)構(gòu)無(wú)力管理相關(guān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)而失敗，所有參與方將蒙受聲譽(yù)損失。
法律和監(jiān)管因素：“一帶一路”國(guó)家需要考慮的相關(guān)因素包括：
1.土地權(quán)利
土地權(quán)利的重要性取決于項(xiàng)目是否土地密集型項(xiàng)目以及項(xiàng)目選擇的PPP模式。對(duì)于租賃型安排、BOT/BOO和特許權(quán)模式而言，私營(yíng)機(jī)構(gòu)及其融資方需要確保土地進(jìn)入權(quán)和使用權(quán)(a)有足夠確定性；(b)不會(huì)被隨意收回；以及(c)（如需）可以向分包商和融資方轉(zhuǎn)讓。
2.資產(chǎn)擔(dān)保
為了以具有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的條款吸引融資，私營(yíng)機(jī)構(gòu)需要說(shuō)服融資方其能夠取得合適的擔(dān)保和信用支持，包括土地以及相關(guān)項(xiàng)目權(quán)益和項(xiàng)目資產(chǎn)上的擔(dān)保（或類似權(quán)利）。融資方還需要確認(rèn)(a)其可以始終保持相對(duì)于無(wú)擔(dān)保債權(quán)人或低順位債權(quán)人的優(yōu)先性；(b)在發(fā)生違約時(shí)可強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行擔(dān)保；以及(c) 在獲得承認(rèn)的其他司法轄區(qū)獲得的判決能夠強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行。
3.貸款人介入權(quán)
當(dāng)?shù)胤珊晚?xiàng)目文件還需要允許貸款人有介入的權(quán)利，可以在觸發(fā)項(xiàng)目終止權(quán)之前保護(hù)其投資。
4.終止賠償/政府擔(dān)保
為確保項(xiàng)目具有商業(yè)可融資性/可投資性，東道國(guó)政府可能需要同意在項(xiàng)目因特定情況終止的情況下進(jìn)行賠償或提供擔(dān)保。在某些國(guó)家，當(dāng)?shù)胤刹辉试S這種安排，因此需要針對(duì)PPP模式修訂相關(guān)法律（或提供合適的替代方案）。
5.爭(zhēng)議解決
當(dāng)?shù)胤杀仨氃试S選擇合適的爭(zhēng)議解決機(jī)制，通常需要在項(xiàng)目合同中增加和強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行‘仲裁協(xié)議’條款，允許在英國(guó)等廣泛認(rèn)可的司法轄區(qū)進(jìn)行仲裁。能否在東道國(guó)強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決也是融資方和承包商的主要考慮因素。
6.PPP部門
雖然并非必備條件，但在東道國(guó)政府設(shè)立管理PPP模式的PPP部門將有助于確保執(zhí)行一致性和提高執(zhí)行的確定性，同時(shí)為中國(guó)的協(xié)商和政策協(xié)調(diào)提供聯(lián)系人。PPP部門還可適時(shí)制訂明確的采購(gòu)流程，推進(jìn)程序的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化，提高效率。
7.有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的顧問
根據(jù)項(xiàng)目地點(diǎn)和資產(chǎn)類型，PPP模式的成功實(shí)施還可能需要獲得專業(yè)技術(shù)、財(cái)務(wù)、保險(xiǎn)和法律顧問的意見。專業(yè)顧問的參與通常是吸引有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的社會(huì)資本參與的必要條件。在東道國(guó)擁有相關(guān)經(jīng)驗(yàn)前，中國(guó)和其他更發(fā)達(dá)的經(jīng)濟(jì)體是提供上述經(jīng)驗(yàn)主要渠道，東道國(guó)政府需要承認(rèn)其重要性并降低相關(guān)顧問參與的門檻（包括簽證和工作許可等）。
One Belt One Road: How can PPPs help?
Cliffordchance
OBOR snapshot
· Land and sea based.
· 60+ countries, 3 continents.
· Centred around 6 transport corridors.
· Access to more than 65% of global population and 35% of global GDP.
· Objectives include reducing trade impediments, facilitating connectivity of facilities and people, financial integration and policy co-ordination.
One Belt One Road (OBOR) is a key initiative of the Chinese government and seeks to restore the country’s old trade routes into other parts of Asia, Europe and Africa, while boosting economic activity and connectivity within a vast region encompassing more than 60 countries, two thirds of the world’s population and one third of global GDP.
While Chinese investment within OBOR is likely to take a number of different forms, in this paper we set out the reasons why the public-private partnership (PPP) model could perform a central role in the delivery of infrastructure projects in OBOR countries. We also identify the conditions to be addressed for the successful deployment of the PPP model within OBOR.
PPPs present a unique opportunity for China and other countries within OBOR to procure infrastructure in a manner which reduces the burden on government budgets, may secure host government ’buy in’ and accountability for projects and provides a pathway for Chinese specialist skills, goods and services, while creating a long term platform for the development of local private sector skills in OBOR countries.
Choosing a PPP model for a project
As these differing models show, PPP can be deployed in a number of ways in order to fit the objectives of China as the sponsor of OBOR, and of host governments and market participants including equity investors, financiers and contractors, and to accommodate operational and strategic priorities in the relevant sector. It is not "one size fits all". For example, if the intention is to reduce the burden on government budgets by attracting private capital (a central driver for PPP roll out in the UK), then a BOT/BTO/BOO model may be preferable to a simple service contract (where capital investment remains the responsibility of the public sector). If risk transfer is the primary motivation, a concession PPP model, used in a number of Australian toll road projects, may be more appropriate. If however the host government seeks to maintain overall control over the service or asset, or re-evaluate and re-let private sector arrangements every few years, a service/management contract or lease arrangement may be more suitable.
The joint venture model is increasingly used in established PPP markets to accommodate a desire for the public partner to have greater transparency over the delivery of the project. In the context of OBOR, this model may provide an alternative mode of investment for China while also mitigating any concerns over the credit worthiness of a host government and therefore being a catalyst for the particupation of third party equity investors (whether from China or elsewhere) who may be encouraged to invest alongisde a prominent Chinese entity.
Role of host governments and Bilateral Investment Treaties
The common element across each of these PPP models is the central role played not only by the private sector participant, but also the Authority which is letting the service/management contract or procuring the BOT or concession. An additional element is added to that role if the Authority or host government establishes a joint venture in order to take an equity stake in the project.
Notwithstanding that China is the overall sponsor of OBOR, the deployment of PPPs in OBOR countries will require the active participation of relevant agencies of the host governments, including in particular the Ministry of Finance/Treasury which will be responsible for funding host government payments to the private sector partner. The ’partnership’ element of PPP is therefore given broader meaning in the context of OBOR to encompass the partnership between China and the relevant host government, and that between the relevant host government agency and the appointed private sector partner. We explore this further in ’Host government buy-in and accountability’ below.
To secure the co-operation and active participation of host governments, the progress China has been making in respect of Bilateral Investment Treaties is significant. Ensuring that such treaties accommodate (or evolve to accommodate) the breadth and scale of proposed OBOR initiatives is in the interest of all parties.
PPP model across asset classes
PPP models has been deployed in a number of asset classes throughout the world. These include economic infrastructure such as roads, bridges, tunnels, rail, ports, airports and broadband services, and social/public infrastructure such as social housing, schools, hospitals, prisons, water, waste and defence facilities. To an extent, PPP models deployed across these sectors are self selective: lease contracts and concessions are more easily deployed for economic infrastructure which attracts a specific user payment (e.g. ports, airports and toll roads), whereas service/management contracts and BOT arrangements (in any form) can be procured across a broader range of economic and social assets.
As is clear from the above, however, contractual settings in individual projects can be adapted to meet the particular requirements of China, the relevant host government and the private sector.
Benefits of PPP
In the context of the OBOR, the PPP model offers a number of benefits when compared to traditional procurement models backed by government to government grants extended by China.
Reduce budget burden
Use of private sector capital
Regardless of whether the capital cost of a project is significant, attracting investment from the private sector both limits the capital commitment from China and/or a host government, and facilitates the provision of financing from the commercial debt markets. While these benefits are most apparent in a BOT or concession PPP which facilitates the private sector meeting a high initial cost of development, the procurement of services via a service/management contract or a lease arrangement can also facilitate management of a host government’s operating budget by freeing working capital and providing cost certainty for services.
China’s investment in OBOR, while vast, could be made to go further in this manner by (a) attracting private sector investment and (b) moving a substantial part of the funding burden to the host government which, under a service/management contract or BOT model, will be responsible for making payments to the private sector for the provision of the relevant service.
The use of private capital in this manner will also deepen the financial markets in the host country over the longer term.
Private sector discipline
The benefit of private sector capital is not restricted to the simple availability of monies. The participation of external financiers will likely result in the development of a robust contractual structure which focuses on ensuring (a) the delivery of the relevant infrastructure on time, to budget and to specification, and (b) the optimal operation thereof, strict due diligence during procurement and timely delivery of information during the term of the project. The incentives on private debt and equity financiers to succeed in delivering the PPP align the interests of such financiers with those of China and its OBOR partners.
Host government creditworthiness
Given that a number of OBOR countries are developing economies, the creditworthiness of host governments may be a challenge for private sector participants and their financiers. The PPP model introduces a partial mitigant by allocating the host government’s payment obligations over the period of the relevant contract. China may also be able to provide guarantees or other credit enhancements to further mitigate these barriers to private sector investment in OBOR countries.
Multilateral financial institutions have been particularly active in helping manage these risks in developing economies by offering credit enhancement and insurance products and by creating project structuring units to assist host governments in preparing their procurements in a manner which is bankable/investable from a private sector perspective. China could take a similar approach, including via the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank which, though not formally part of OBOR, could play a key role in the successful execution of OBOR projects.
China’s role
Reducing the reliance on China’s OBOR budget could also diversify the way in which China and Chinese companies contribute to projects. A government to government grant puts China in the role of project sponsor, with broad exposure to the risks of the venture. If, under a PPP, any initial capital costs are met by the private sector and the host government is primarily responsible for ongoing service payments, China can choose to provide commercial debt or equity directly to the project, provide credit enhancement or structuring support as described above or limit itself to procuring roles on the project for Chinese contractors. In this manner, the PPP model can generate trade and capital investment and open up pathways for Chinese productive capacity, while expanding the footprint of China’s OBOR capital budget by leveraging it to access private sector capital and long-term revenue streams from host governments.
Efficiency in risk allocation
PPPs are designed so that design, construction, completion and operational risks are allocated to the party which is best able to manage them. In developing OBOR countries, in particular, where host government bodies may not have the necessary long-term project skills and private sector parties (whether local, Chinese or from a third nation) do, it follows that the risks associated with project delivery should be transferred to the private sector. In so doing, China and its OBOR partners should obtain best value because those with the greatest and most relevant expertise will be best able to manage or absorb the risks, thereby pricing them more economically and minimising cost.
The whole-life analysis central to a PPP project at the pre-financing stage also encourages a comprehensive and holistic approach to finding solutions to technical and commercial risks from the outset in a way that is satisfactory to all participants and which will inevitably serve to reduce overall project costs.
The patronage and commitment of host governments is essential to the success of OBOR, whatever the procurement model used. Each PPP model, however, enhances the prospects of such co-operative ’buy-in’ by requiring the procuring Authority to prioritise, and take ownership of, the service output required. The Authority sets the service specifications and performance standards, and then is put in a position to evaluate competing private sector parties’ capacity to meet those requirements in a bidding process. Changes can also be made to such requirements once private sector feedback is collected.
Once the contract is awarded, the Authority is given the contractual tools to enforce its requirements (including via the levying of liquidated damages or payment deductions). As a consequence, the Authority is accountable for the specifications and standards imposed (and their enforcement), the choice of private sector partner and payment for services provided.
With its vast experience of managing large projects, China can consult with host governments to bring robustness to this process, particularly for developing OBOR countries. This will also provide a platform for the coordination of policy, political co-operation and the connectivity of people and facilities, each a central tenet of OBOR.
Exports
By broadening China’s role beyond the contribution of monies to finance OBOR projects, the PPP model generates a pathway for China to contribute:
a.its knowhow and experience of managing large projects in the procurement, delivery and operations phases to OBOR countries;
b.goods and services, including as a supplier of commodities and equipment to projects; and
c.most importantly, specialist skills, particularly via Chinese entities which may become contractors on such projects.
In addition to diversifying China’s exports and providing an outlet for Chinese productive capacity and enterprise, this will accelerate China’s transition from an economy based on manufacturing to one based on services.
Private sector skills
At its core, the PPP model seeks to maximise the use of private sector skills. This will be important for OBOR countries, not only to ensure community buy-in to projects but also to secure the economic multiplier effects which come with local resources being utilised and rewarded. China would be well placed to fill any skills gaps in host countries by exporting the specialist skills it has in abundance, while building the basis for long term consultation and co-operation.
Foreign ownership
One practical constraint on direct Chinese investment into projects is the foreign ownership restrictions which apply in a number of OBOR countries. The platform which the PPP model provides for China to vary the nature of its contribution to such projects may mitigate this concern, while absolving host governments of the need to make a difficult choice between attracting Chinese patronage and relaxing long-established foreign ownership laws.
Flexibility
As described above, the PPP model offers a range of options for capital investment, risk allocation, compensation of the private sector and for the role China takes on a project. This flexibility is amongst its key strengths.
Standardisation
In the medium to long term, the PPP model offers a platform for the standardisation of procurement models, risk allocation, public sector funding models, private sector financing structures, security arrangements, documentation and dispute resolution within OBOR countries and more broadly throughout OBOR corridors. This standardisation process has occurred to a significant degree in mature PPP markets such as the UK and Australia and has driven cost and time efficiency in the delivery of projects. In the same way, deployment of the PPP model can accelerate the realisation of the ambitions of China and host governments for OBOR.
Success factors for PPPs
For the potential benefits of the PPP model to be delivered, China and its OBOR partners will need to work together to ensure that the key conditions for the successful deployment of PPPs are put in place.
While the specific structures to be put in place and challenges to be overcome will vary from country to country and by reference to asset class, the key success factors for PPPs generally are as follows:
Appropriate countries, sectors and projects: To ensure that OBOR’s momentum is maintained, the countries, sectors and projects for PPPs will need careful consideration. If there is no lengthy track record of successful PPP procurement in an OBOR country, the selection of a simple PPP project which has broad local public support is preferable to struggling with a more complex project. It will also help gently ease the host government, local private sector parties, and Chinese government agencies into the PPP process so that a level of familiarity and proficiency is developed before embarking on more complex PPP projects. In formative procurements, building credibility is key.
Appropriate PPP model: The success of any given PPP project will largely depend upon the selection of a PPP model. Flexibility must be built into the decision-making process so that no single PPP model is necessarily preferred over another, and that the objectives for the procurement are revisited over time to ensure that any changes are reflected in the choice of PPP model.
Clarity of objectives: Time should be taken to establish the parameters, specifications and standards for a project and success should only ever be measured against the same. A misguided evaluation of one project in a country or sector will adversely affect each project to follow.
Reasonable risk allocation: The well-established principle that, in a PPP structure, the risks should be allocated to the party best able to manage those risks, needs to be respected. Inappropriate transfer of risk will likely result in consequential pricing by the private sector, which may adversely affect the PPP’s value for money proposition. It may also increase the risk of private sector default and termination of the project. Ultimately, if the project fails as a result of the private sector’s inability to manage the relevant risk, all participants will suffer reputational damage, wherever the fault lay under the contractual documents.
Legal and regulatory factors: Relevant considerations for the OBOR country include:
Land rights – the relevance of land rights will depend on whether the project is land intensive and the PPP model being used. For lease-type arrangements, BOT/BTO/BOO procurements and concessions, private sector contractors and their financiers will need comfort that land access and use rights are (a) broad, (b) not capable of being summarily withdrawn and (c) where relevant, capable of being assigned to subcontractors and financiers.
Security over assets – in order to attract finance on competitive terms, the private sector will need to be able to get its financiers comfortable that appropriate security and credit support can be granted to financiers, including security (or analogous rights) over land, and over interests in relevant project entities and project assets. Financiers will also need comfort that (a) their priority over unsecured or lower ranking claims is maintained, (b) security can be enforced upon default and (c) judgments obtained in recognised foreign jurisdictions will be enforced.
Lender step-in – local laws and project documentation will need to accommodate lender step-in rights in order to permit lenders to protect their investment prior to any project termination right arising.
Termination compensation / government guarantees – in order for projects to be commercially bankable/investable, the host government will likely need to agree to pay compensation to the private partner upon termination in certain circumstances or provide guarantees. Local laws in some jurisdictions prohibit such arrangements, necesstiating amendments to the law to accommodate PPPs (or appropriate alternative solutions to be put in place).
Dispute resolution – local law must accommodate a recognised dispute resolution regime. Often, this requires the inclusion and enforcement of ’agreement to arbitrate’ provisions in project contracts, and the acceptance of arbitration in an established foreign jurisdiction such as the UK. The ability to enforce such arbitral awards in the host jurisdiction will also be a key consideration for financiers and contractors.
PPP unit – although not a pre-requisite, establishing a PPP unit within host governments to control PPP procurement may provide consistency of approach and build greater certainty of execution, while giving China a focus for its consultation and policy coordination activities. In time, a PPP unit could develop a clear process for procurement and drive the standardisation process to achieve efficiency.
Experienced advisors: The successful implementation of a PPP may, depending on location and asset class, require specialist technical, financial, insurance and legal advice. The availability and participation of such advisors will usually be a prerequisite for attracting private sector financing on competitive terms. Until expertise is developed locally, China and other more advanced economies will be vital sources of such expertise – host governments will need to recognise their importance and limit barriers to their participation (including visa and working rules).
